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Abstract
In this paper we discuss determinants of finn survival and growth in Germany within its
pre-1989 boundaries. We develop our central hypotheses on the basis of a simple
theoretical model describing the self-selection of heterogeneous entrepreneurs into
particular legal forms, and the implications for profitability and survival. We also describe
institutional details of liability regulation and taxation rules which German entrepreneurs
face when choosing a particular legal form for their finns. We then test the predictions of
our model by considering the survival chances and employment growth rates of various
types of enterprises in a sample of approximately 11000 West German finns in all major
sectors of the German economy. in our analysis of finn survival we distinguish between
voluntary liquidaton without losses to creditors, and bankruptcy as forced liquidation.
Finnsunderlimited liability are characterized by higher growth and higher insolvency rates
than comparable finns under full liability. We also confinn the previously found negative
relationship between employment growth and finn size which persists after controlling for
selection biases. The likelihood of insolvencies is a nonmonotonic function offirm size.
Acknowledgement
Financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation and the lentrum fur \Europaische
Wirtschaftsforschung (lEW) is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank the Verband der
Vereine Creditreform for making available the data used in this study. Speci.al acknowledgements
go to Werner Strahler und Jan Stenmans at Creditreform for providing us with detailed accounts on
the data collection process. Andreas Fier, Dietmar Moch, Jurgen Moka, and Wolfgang Schnell
supported us competently in preparing the data for the analysis. We would like to thank G.
Kiihborth and G. Thamm for their willingness to provide us valuable information regarding the
credit-rating behavior of banks, and K.-H. Nohrbass for similar information on the taxation of cor-
porate and non-corporate firrns. We finally are grateful for comments by the participants of the
conferences on Employment Dynamics and Industry Evolution and the 8th G.LF. Conference held,
respectively, in January and February 1995 in Mannheim; and in particular to lvi Eckstein.
Bronwyn Hall, Stephen Klepper. Saul Lach. Norbert Schulz. and David Storey. The usual
disclaimer applies.1 Introduction
The discussion on the detenninants of survival and growth of finns, and with it on the
detenninants of labor demand has become popular among researchers and policy-makers alike.
The reasons for a strong interest at the policy level are rather obvious. At the beginning of the
90s, many European economies have suffered the deepest recession since WW II. This has
caused labour shedding ofa magnitude unknown heretofore, and it has led to a sharp rise in the
number of insolvencies. In Gennany, the number of insolvencies continued to rise even at the
apparent end of the recessionary phase, and the unemployment rate continues to remain at a
high level. For 1994 we observe a postwar record in annual insolvencies, with about 19.000
finn failures and an estimated loss of 168,000 jobs. Similarly, the question of employment
generation has become central to economic policy making especially in Gennany whose
economy is still plagued by high unemployment in the aftennath of unification with fonner East
Gennany.
The scientific investigation of industrial dynamics and the dynamics of employment
demand has also become more popular recently. Starting with the early contributions by Gibrat
(1931) and Simon and Bonini (1956), the relationship between finn size, finn growth, and
industry structure has been under considerable scrutiny.l In part due to Birch's (1981, 1987)
pr~vocative statements about the dominating contribution of small and young firms to
employment growth, the eighties have witnessed an upsurge of empirical studies on the
evolution of firms, and especially on the supply of jobs so generated. Recent contributions to
this literature include studies on the U.S. manufacturing sector by Brock and Evans (1986),
Evans (1987a/b), Hall (1987), Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988, 1989); on the British
manufacturing sector by Dunne and Hughes (1994), and on new finns in the German
manufacturing sector by Wagner (1994).
We add to this string of papers by presenting first estimates from a recently generated
data set on the contribution of West Gennan firms from all major sectors of the economy
(rather than only the manufacturing sector) to the supply of jobs. While the general pattern
derived here is not unlike that shown by the above authors, it also differs in major details. Our
particular focus is on the implications of the finns' liability status. In a well-known paper,
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) predict that the selection of risky projects strongly depends on the
adopted liability rule: under limited liability, projects with more growth potential but also
higher risk of failure tend to be chosen. We develop a simple theoretical model in which the
same risk-return tradeoff is at work, but where entrepreneurs with heterQgeneous human
capital can choose a particular liability regime and project. '
Inthe empirical part of the paper, we analyze determinants of finn survival and growth.
We relate survival and growth to the size of the firm, the firm's age, diversification, legal fonn,
ownership status, and business sector. In our survival estimations, we differentiate between
voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy. This distinction matters both conceptually and
empirically: In ourempirical analysis we show that limited liability finns are characterized by an
above-average rate of insolvency, while they do not playa major role in voluntary business
closings. To the best of our knowledge, this distinction is nowhere conceptualized in the
1 See Scherer and Ross (1990) for a more detailed survey of this literature.literature but in Schary (1991). The result that limited liability firms are more likely to exit via
bankruptcy is surprising especially in view of the fact that Gennan banks. not unlike those in
other countries, aim towards full collateralization of risky credit by eventually resorting to the
shareholder's private property, thus invalidating the liability limitation to shareholders.
Our survival estimates indicate that increasing firm size exerts a negative effect on the
probability of voluntary liquidations. With respect to the probability of insolvencies, firm size
exerts a positive marginal effect for firms with fewer than 18 employees and a negative effect
for larger enterprises. By and large, firm age correlates-negatively with the likelihocxi of both
types of firm failure. Diversification tends to lower the likelihocxi of voluntary liquidation, but
to our surprise does not affect the probability of compulsory liquidation.
In our analysis of firm growth we confirm previous research results that find a negative
correlation between employment growth and firm size and age. More interestingly, limited
liability firms tend to display considerably higher growth rates than single proprietorships
which are the largest group offirms under unlimited liability. This, together with the significant
increase in the probability of insolvency, confirms the hypothesis advanced by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and mimicked in our theoretical model, that limited liability leads entrepreneurs
to invest in riskier projects with more growth potential.
We proceed as follows. Insection 2, we describe a simple theoretical model relating the
choice of liability rule to the entrepreneur's human capital, and demonstrate consequences on
the firm's growth and survival potential. In Section 3 we describe the legal fonns that can be
adopted by a German firm and discuss their implications for liability and taxation. Section 4
contains a description of the data and the models used to analyze firm sunrival and growth. A
presentation and discussion of the results from this analysis follows in section S. We conclude
in the final section and indicate avenues for further research.
2 Liability, Human Capital, and the Risk Structure ofProjects
• A Simple Model
Our central hypotheses can best be stated in the context of a simple model in which
heterogeneous entrepreneurs endowed with given human capital can choose exactly one
project from a continuum of project alternatives. This project may involve both the investment
project of an existing firm; as well as the generation of the firm itself. We assume that the
expected return of any project is known, and that the risk of project failure is positively
correlated with that return. Unlike in the approach taken by Jovanovic (1982), we suppose that
each entrepreneur knows with certainty his endowment of human capital, which positively
affects the likelihood of project success.
The major complication in our model is the entrepreneur's choice of legal form. To
keep matters simple, we will distinguish two types. The first - limited liability - will insure
entrepreneurs against project failure, in which case the entrepreneur will have to pay some
fixed amount not contingent on the expected return of the project. In the second case -
unlimited liability - the entrepreneur's losses incurred in case of project failure will depend on
his financial engagement. We assume that upon failu~e, our investor will have to pay some
amount proportional to the expected return of the project.
2If the choice of a particular legal fonn would entail no costs, all entrepreneurs would
opt for the limited liability status. Ceteris paribus, this choice would limit the losses in case of
failure and therefore be strictly preferable. However, there are costs associated with choosing
that legal fonn. For example, these costs may be due to tax rules or higher costs of capital..
Note also that suppliers may treat finns with limited liability with greater caution than firms
with full liability, e.g. by requesting advance payment for ordered materials and services. In all,
adopting the status of limited liability is likely to involve higher costs. Due to these cost
differences, the choices made by entrepreneurs,endowed with different levels of human capital
are less clear ex ante. However, we will show in the following model that some strong
conclusions can be derived underfairly mild assumptions.
Fonnally, suppose that there is a continuum of projects from which the typical
entrepreneur can choose that are indexed by their strictly positive and finite expected return
O. Under unlimited liability, the case indexed by U, project failure involves a loss of
~o, ~ > O. The payoff j( involved in choosing a project type 0 is summarized by
(l) JtU ={o if success
-~o iffailure.
Under limited liability, indexed by L, the cOlTesponding payoff is given by
(2) :rr: L = {CPO if success
o iffailure,
where qJ < 1 denotes the reduction in project yield due to the implicit cost of liability
limitation. The loss in case of project failure is standardized to zero without loss of generality.
The probability of concluding a project successfully is a function of the entrepreneur's
human capital and of project return in the case of success. In line with much of the financial
markets literature, we assume on the latter a positive risk-return relationship: ceteris paribus,
high-return projects are more likely to fail. As to the fonner, we suppose that human capital
enhances the. likelihood of successful project completion. Hence, the probability of successful
completion of a project of type 0 by an entrepreneur with endowment of human capital
HE [gil] c R+ is given byp(H,o). Our assumptions are summarized in
op 02p op 02p
(3) a6 < 0, 002 > 0, oH > 0 and oH00 ~ U.
Hence, the probability of success decreases at a decreasing rate in expected project return, and
that probability increases in toto as well as at the margin in the entrepreneur's human capital.
Conditional upon the choice of liability rule, our entrepreneur is assumed to select a
project of type 0 by maximizing his expected profit. Under unlimited liability, this is
(4) E(:rr:L') = p(H,o)o + [1- plH,o)] (-~O)= 0[0 + !.dp(H,o) -~],
(5)
while under limited liability it is
(4') E(j( L) = p(H,O)cp 0 .
Assuming an interior solution which is obtained under very plausible assumptions, the
first order condition under unlimited liability is given by
op(H,o)
00 0 + p(H,o) - A = ()
3where A:= _f..!_ E (0,1). Underlimited liability, that first order condition reduces to the case
1+ f..!
where f..! =0 and hence A=O. We henceforth assume that the second order condition holds
throughout.
We can show in the context of this simple model that projects selected under limited
liability carry a higher return if successful, and are more risky than projects selected under
unlimited liability. This effect is even more pointed ifentrepreneurs endowed with high human
capital tend to prefer limited liability. Without imposing much stronger assumptions it was not
possible to demonstrate within our model that they indeed do. There is a systematic reason for
this, however. Any increase in human capital results in two effects: a direct increase in the
probability of success; and, via the choice of a higher return project, a decrease in that very
probability. While we can give plausible conditions under which one dominates the other, we
are unable to evaluate the different strength of the two forces under limited versus unlimited
liability.
We now state the formal results in two propositions, and formally specify conditions
under which limited liability is chosen by entrepreneurs endowed with higher human capital.
The proofs can be found in Appendix A.
PROPOSITION 1: c/(1/) > OU (HJ
We show in the proof that for any level of human capital, projects chosen under limited liability
will have higher expected return than projects chosen under full liability, i.e. (0/- (H) > be(H).
From this result the proposition follows immediately because OL (H) can be shown to be
strictly increasing in human capital H. Thus, the difference in expected returns will increase if
the propensity to adopt liability limitations increases with the entrepreneur's human capital.
PROPOSITION 2: p(l/, OL(jj)) < p(H OU (HJ) if ~ ap ~ ~ ap .
:..=..J OL aH ao aH
Thus, the failure rate of high human capital types adopting limited liability will be higher than
the failure rate of individuals with low human capital levels under full liability if the average
marginal increase in success probability due to higher human capital is smaller or equal to the
respective marginal increase.
Let 0 (f..!,H) be the solution to (5), and
Ett u (I1,H)):=o (I1,H) [(1+ l1)p(H,b (I1,H)) - 11] as well as'.
E(n; L(H)):=p(H,o (O,H))qJo (O,H).
Lemma: For all H, there exists a unique ~ (H) such that E(:rL' (~(H),H)) =E(:rl.(H)).
Furthermore, 11 ~ j:t(H) ~.E(;ru (~(H),H))~E(:tL (H)).
As we show in Appendix A. the choice of limited liability is more likely with increased
human capital, if either the optimal project choice involves a much higher return project under
limited than under unlimited liability; orif the increase in the probability of project success with
an increase in human capital is much stronger if the higher return limited liability project is
chosen.
4Thus our simple model predicts the following two regularities. First, firms operating
under limited liability should perform at relatively high rates of return when compared to finns
under unlimited liability. And second, these firms should be characterized by above-average
mortality. These are our two central hypotheses. We have added conditions under which
entrepreneurs endowed with higner human capital indeed choose limited liability. However, the
latter are difficult to verify. This especially calls for an empirical clarification.
A number of qualifications apply when we try to test these predictions empirically.
First, since we cannot observe profitability in our data, we will interpret employment growth as
an indicator of profitability. Second, insolvencies are not the only type of exit from a given
market. Over time, entrepreneurs may adjust their expectations to changes in business
condition~and simply choose to liquidate voluntarily. Our simple one-shot model cannot help
us to develop insights with respect to this decision. While we do not explore theoretically the
underlying mechanisms that bring about voluntary liquidations, we will have to differentiate
them from insolvencies in our empirical analysis. Finally, there may be other reasons why
German entrepreneurs (or managers) choose a particular legal form. Clearly, the simple model
captures only some institutional aspects of legal forms and liability statutes in the Federal
Republic of Germany. In the following section we discuss this institutional framework in more
detail.
3 Institutional Aspects ofLiability Limitations
In this section, we discuss the legal forms that can be adopted by a German firm operat-
ing for profit
2
, together with the liabilities taken by its owners under each legal form. Not un-
like international practice, German business law distinguishes between legal forms in which
firms have no legal capacity separate from its owners, and those in which firms do have this
capacity. Characteristic examples of the former are the individual proprietorship
(Einzelunternehmungi and the civil law association (BGB-Gesellschq(tl. Limited and general
commercial partnerships (Kommanditgesellsch4t (KG) and qr(ene Handelsgesellschaft
(OHG)) also share that legal status. However, these two types of partnerships can be parties in
real estate transactions and in litigation. Legal forms in which firms have full legal capacity are
the commercial partnership limited by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft aufAktien - KGaA), the
limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Hq(tung - GmbH) an,d the joint stock
corporation (Aktiengesellschaft -AGl. \
A second standard distinction is between the non-corporate firm (Personengesellscha,(t)
and the corporate firm (Kapitalgesellschq(t - KG). For the legal fOlms explicitly considered in
this paper, the drawing line between those is exactly analogous to that between legal
capacities.
In our present analysis. we have r('mo\,\..'<.Ithe nonprofit organizations from our data base.
J Individual proprietorships are run by the oWI\\.'r. with at most one donnant pat1nL'r.
~ The civil law association is used as a convenient legal form for temporary projects. One therefore should
expect a livelihood substantially shorter than that of fiml.~ undL'r othL'r kgal forms.
5For the purpose of our analysis, two major differences stand out between these two le-
gal forms, namely the tax treatment of profits and equity, and the liability of their owners. As
to the tax treatment, the major difference is that in the first group of non-corporate firms with-
out legal capacity, only the owners are tax liable. Both, the firm's current profits and its stock
of equity are taxed in proportion to the owner's share. The profit and wealth components are
added to, and treated identically to the partner's other income and wealth. By contrast, corpo-
rate finns are ~parate legal identities also for tax purposes. Corporate retained earnings are
taxed at a (constant) marginal rate of currently 50 percent while earnings distributed are taxed
at a rate of 36 percent. Corporate wealth is also taxed at the level of the corporation. In
contrast to U.S. shareholders, the typical German shareholder is not double-taxed on his share
of corporate earnings distributed. Indeed, he receives a full rebate on the corporate income
taxes withheld. However, he is fully tax liable for his share of corporate wealth. It follows first
that in contrast to non-corporate income, corporate income. if retained. is always taxed at a
relatively high percentage rate, and corporate wealth is double taxed.
As to the liability of the owners of non-corporate and corporate firms: As customary,
the owners of the former type of finn are fully liable with their entire personal assets
5
• and not
only with the equity deposited with the firm, while the owners of the latter type are only liable
up to the amount of their individual share. Speaking in broad terms, limited liability must be
"bought" at the cost of increased tax liability, although the differential cost is not nearly as
large as in the U.S.
6
As we will show below, the limited liability company as a non-public corporate legal
form is much more important in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Several reasons
could account for this. First, the limited liability status used to be advantageous relative to that
of the public corporation because. up to a change in legislation effective 1987. disclosure re-
quirements were substantially weaker. For all practical purposes they ~1ill are to date. since
German courts do not as yet enforce the disclosure rule with great vigour. Second. the limited
liability status has become increasingly important relative to the non-corporate legal forms. all
involving full liability, because the 1977 corporate income tax reform has led to a reduction in
the corporate income tax burden on distributed earnings, and the 1980 change in legislation on
GmhHs has incorporated the possibility of a limited liability company involving just one
partner, a status not available before.i
The comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different legal forms with respect
to tax treatment and liability have also led to a legal form combining the advantages of both,
namely the limited commercial partnership formed with a limited liability compa'ny (GmbH &
Co. KG). Under this legal form, both, liability is limited, and profits are subject to the partners'
income tax. In particular, retained earnings can be made subject to the lower tax rate often ap-
plying to income, as long as the partners agree to distribute all earnings, and to deposit (part
5 By exception, the Kommallditgcscllschaji considers two types of shareholders. one of which is fully liable.
and the other liable only up to the share value.
6 Even that smaller increase in tax b~den can be substantially rcducl.'<l by skillful financing arrangements
(Raab 1993).
7 Rather than depositing his assets in his company. a wealthy owner of a one person GmbH can substantially
save taxes on both corporate wealth and on retained earnings by holding minimal l'quity; distributing all
earnings to himself; and using his assets as a personal collateral for debt financing.
6of) them after taxation. In addition, equity is only subject to double taxation in as much it is as-
S()ciated with the GmbH & Co. KG.
As mentioned above, the overall distribution of legal forms has been subject to rather
dramatic changes overthe last two decades. We used establishment census data from 1970 and
1987 to compare the absolute number and share of firms in various legal forms. The absolute
number of firms with limited liability grew by a factor of more than 6 in this period. In 1970,
only 1.8 per c~nt of all firms were incorporated in this form, accounting for about fifteen per
cent of all employees. However, by 1987, about 10.5 per cent of all firms were GmbHs and the
employment share accounted for by this legal form had risen to almost 26 percent.
8 In terms of
total employment share, all other legal forms lost in comparison to the GmbH. Especially non-
corporate legal forms like the individual proprietorship and the civil law association (JJGB-
Gese//schaft), the OHG, and stock-based legal forms like the AG and KGaA lost in
importance.
4 Dataand Variables
4.1 Data Source and SampleConstruction
We only provide a brief description of data source and sample construction here. A
more detailed account is given in Appendix B of this paper. The data originate with Germany's
largest credit rating agency and were obtained in six-month intervals starting in July 1989. For
the purpose of this analysis, eight linked cross-sections were available. The unit of observation
is the legally independent enterprise. The initial sample consisted of 13346 firms. Due to a
number of exclusions (e.g. of agricultural and public sector firms) and data constraints
described in some detail in Appendix B, we use information on the survival status of 10961
firms. Firm relocations, mergers, and changes in ownership are not counted as exits (i.e.
failures) in our analysis, since they do lead to a reorganization, but not necessarily to the
termination of economic activities pursued in the enterprise. Among the 10961 relevant
observations, we observe employment growth rates for only 8068 enterprises. The difference
between the number of firms with growth rate observations and the number of firms with
information on their survival status is due to two sources. First, for non-survivors our data do
not allow us to compute employment growth rates. Second. there are a number of cases in
which the credit-rating agency did not update the employment information in our sample. Since
both of these effects may cause selection biases, we account for them in our analysis of
employment growth rates.
4.2 Specification and Variable Definitions
The first dependent variable analyzed here is the firm's survi\'al status. Note that the
survival status data obtained from the credit rating data has been complemented by a large
To this figure we should add the employment in GmhH's run by Kn/llm'1Il"it:~csc/lsc"4tcll, Unfortunately.
the data do not allow for the separation of this component from the share of employment providl'd by the
KG·s.
7number of telephone interviews (see Appendix B for details). We consider the survival
information combined from these two sources as highly reliable. Finns were classified as
insolvencies if they had been in business prior to July 1, 1989 and had declared an insolvency
until March 1, 1994. If a voluntary business liquidation (without losses to creditors) had
occurred during the same period, the firms were classified as voluntalJ' liquidations. In the
empirical analysis, we estimate logit specifications for the combined group of closed
enterprises. Since liability limitations will not work to the entrepreneur's advantage in the case
of voluntary liquidations, it is unlikely that combining both exit types is an innocuous
estimation strategy. Therefore, we test for systematic differences between exit types in a
multinomial logit specification with no exit as the base category and insolvency and voluntary
liquidation as the two choices. All of the independent variables used in the survival analysis are
taken to represent predetermined values and are obtained from the time period prior to July 1,
1989.
In our specification of growth equations we differ from previous studies that have used
credit rating data. Instead of attributing employment data to a particular year, we make use of
the precise "date of interview" information in our data and compute the corresponding annual
growth rate. For each firm, the longest possible time that elapsed between interviews is taken
in order to obtain more robust growth estimates. Unfortunately, the data are not updated often
enough by the credit rating agency to compute successive growth rates for a large number of
firms. The age and size variables in the growth equations refer to the size and age of the firm at
the beginning of the respective growth period. Following Evans o987ajb) we specify
regressions with the firm's employment growth rate as the dependent variable, and a second-
order polynomial in logari~ms of age and size as the main independent variables. To test our
hypotheses regarding the correlation between legal forms and growth, we employ a set of
dummy variables characterizing the legal form of the firm at the beginning of the observation
period.
In the following section we briefly discuss measurement issues and the definitions of the
dependent and independent variables.
Survival Status. Measuring the firm's survival span is less trivial than it seems at first
sight. since it involves the difficult task of determining exactly when a firm ceases and when it
starts to exist. Forexample, some researchers have argued that a change in ownership, location
or even legal form may induce changes substantial enough to change the firm's id"entity. In our
data set, we are confronted with similar questions. since roughly one third of all firms are
characterized by a date of foundation coinciding with their last change'of legal form.
Fortunately, we have information on the date(s) of foundation of the legal predecessor(s) of
this "new" entity. Firm mortality is not easily pinned to a particular date, either. In particular, a
finn may declare bankruptcy, but continue production for years to come. However, we have
information on the date when a firm had to register its financial misfortune, as well as a date
when the firm actually went out of production.
We.use an "economic" measure of total survival span which represents the longest
possible combination of birth and mortality dates (i.e. the time elapsed between the earliest
registered date of foundation and the latest recorded entry regarding the finn's liquidation). To
give a stylized example, a finn founded in 1950 as a non-corporate finn (this date being





'where E(t) is the finn's number of employees at time t, and t2 and t, are interview dates.
Since this computation introduces an additional source of heteroskedasticity in our regressions,
we use White's (1984) method of computing a robust variance-covariance matrix for the
growth equations. In addition to heteroskedasticity, this method of computing an employment
growth rate requires us to use vintage (or time) dummies in our regressions. We do so by
introducing dummy variables for all combinations of interview years that delimit the growth
observation periods.
Firm Size. The finn's initial size is computed as the natural logarithm of the finn's num-
ber of employees (full-time equivalents). For the survival analysis, we use information from the
latest interview prior to July 1, 1989 to compute the measure LSIZE. In the growth equations,
LSIZE is computed from the interview data at the beginning of the period for which we
compute a growth rate. As it tums out, the implications from using the same measure in
survival and gro\\1h equations are only minor.
Firm Age. It is clear that considerations similar to those regarding the survival time of
an enterprise have to be taken into account in the case of the finn's age. Again, we assume that
the firm began to exist at the earliest registered day of foundation. The logarithm of the finn's
age will be denoted LAGE.
Legal Form. As discussed in section 3, German law allows for a number of ways in
which entrepreneurs can enter the economic arena. These fOlms of incorporation may bting
along different ways of taxation, liability statutes and mandatory ownership st~ctures. For the
purpose ofthe empirical analysis, we will use the dummy variables
BGB - civil law association (BGB-Gesellsch(~(t),
GMBH -limited liability firm (Gesellschaft mit beschriinkterHaftung),
GMBHCO - limited commercial partnership formed with a limited liability company
(GmbH & Co. KG),
- limited commerical partnership (KoJl1manditgeselL~ch(lft),
-- general commerical partnership (O/rene Handelsgesellschaft),
- stock-based corporate firm (Akticngescllschaft and KommClnditgesellschaft
aufAktien).
thus appears as newly founded and incorporated in 1960. The finn may have declared
bankruptcy in 1987 and finally ceased production in 1989. By our definition, survival spans 39
years in this stylized example.
When comparing our mortality data to those of other studies, it should be kept in mind
that take-overs and mergers are occasionally taken to represent finn deaths (e.g. in Dunne and
Hughes 1994) while we only interpret them as finn failures if the finn ceases to exist as an
economically active unit, irrespective ofownership.
Employment Growth Rate. The central variable in the analysis of finn growth is the
finn's employment growth rate. As indicated in the above, the computation of growth rates for
our data is somewhat more difficult than in standard panel data. However, since the date of the
interviews is recorded in the dataset, the growth rate can be computed from the employment
data and the time difference between interviews. Ourdefinition of the growth rate g is
log E(t2 ) -logE(t))
g=
9The reference group are enterprises in the form of the individual proprietorship (Einze/-
untemehmen and Gewerbebetrieb). To avoid simultaneity problems, all of these variables again
refer to the earliest listed information in our data, i.e. the legal form status prior to the
beginning of the period of observation. For example, firms may have changed their legal fonn
after this information was recorded, in order to reduce liability in the face of increasing debt.
This transition process itself may be of considerable interest (e.g. for the prediction of
insolvencies), but we presently do not make use of this infonnation, since our data do not
allow us to treat the simultaneity problem in a convincing manner.
Diversification. This is a simple dummy variable (DIVERS) assuming the value 1 if the
finn has a secondary industry classification in a one-digit sector different from the primary one,
and 0 otherwise.
Subsidiary Finns. Our data allow us to identify enterprises which are direct subsidiaries
of other finns. This variable (SUBSIDIARY) is based on the ownership structure of the finn
and is coded as 1 if the enterprise is under complete control of otherfinns.
Industry Classification. We use a set of 28 dummy variables at the two digit level to
control for industry-specific effects.
9
5 Descriptive Statistics and Estimation Results
5.1 DescriptiveStatistics
We first describe several features of the finns contained in our data set before
proceeding to a discussion of the estimation results. Table] presents descriptive statistics for
the full sample with 10961 observations and for the sample of firms for which we were able to
compute employment growth rates (8098 observations).
TABLE I ABOUT HERE
A number of points are noteworthy. First, the average employment of finns in the
growth sample is considerably higher than in the overall sample. Second, firms in the growth
sample are about 2.5 years older than in the complete sample. And finally, the share of single
proprietorships among the finns in the full sample is larger, i.e. finns with limited liability occur
somewhat more frequently in the growth sample than in the total sample. We conjecture that
this form of selectivity is simply a reflection of the business orientation of credit rating finns.
Finns with limited liability are more likely to encounter supplier finns which are willing to
invest in information about this particular customer. Larger firms are likely to do more business
transactions which may again involve a larger number of suppliers who would want to obtain
infonnation about their customer's willingness to pay. At this point, it is not clear what the
effect ofthis sampling distortion is. If limited liability finns have a greater ex ante probability of
being observed and if they display above-average growth as our model would suggest, then a
positive correlation. between sampling and growth might emerge. On the other hand, if small
9 Interestingly, the usc of legal fonn dummies in rhe regressions described below renders olle-digit industry
controls virtually insignificant.
10firms tend to be screened out and the size-growth correlation is negative, then a negative
correlation between sampling and growth is possible. Since other studies using credit-rating
data have not investigated the effect of sampling bias other than the standard survivor bias, we
cannot make use of previous experience to answer this question. We will come back to this
point inourconclusions. Note that the median size of!inns in our sample is relatively small. 50
percentofall firms havefewer than 8 employees at the beginningofthe sampling period.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
With the theoretical model presented in section 2 of the paper we were not able to
resolve the question whether entrepreneurs with high human capital would choose legal forms
with liability limitation as a response to the enhanced risk of project failure. Recall that this
ambiguity arises naturally in our model, since we assume that increased human capital has two
effects. On the one hand, itreduces the risk ofproject fail~, all else being equal. On the other
hand higher human capital makes it worthwhile for the entrepreneur to choose projects with
higher returns and thus with higher ex ante risk. Since we cannot derive simple theoretical
predictions, we turn to a·subsample of our data to shed some light on this question. To arrive
at this particular subsample, we selected 3440 firms which were owned and managed by one
person and for which we had information to infer the terminal educational degree of the
entrepreneur from our data. As a side-effect of this selection process, some types of legal
forms are dropped, but the most interesting groups - single proprietorships, GmbHs, and
GmbH&Co.KGs are well-represented.
The degree information obtained from the data allows us to classify the entrepreneurs
into those with little human capital (i.e. not even apprenticeship training), those with
apprenticeship training, master-craftsmen, individuals with university training, and finally
individuals who held a doctoral degree or a professorship at the beginning of our sampling
period. The distribution of legal form choices is quite revealing. Table 2 displays the
percentage of legal forms within each human capital group. Legal forms with limited liability
(GmbH and GmbH&Co.KG) account for only 10 percent of all firms if the entrepreneur does
not have apprenticeship training. For those with apprenticeship the percentage is 27 per cent,
for master craftsmen it is 14.6 per cent. Conversely, entrepreneurs with a university degree
choose limited liability in 57.9 per cent of all cases, and individuals with a doctorate or a
professorship relie in 77.1 percent of all cases on liability limitations for their ownenterprise.
Clearly, the subsample used here is selective and the human capital indicators are rather
crude. The topic needs further substantiation, but we are nonetheless surprised how clearly the
data point to a nexus between human capital and the choice of legal form. By implication,
Table 2 also provides evidence that the second proposition derived from our model will be of
some relevance.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 presents sample frequencies of insolvencies and voluntary liquidations by firm
age and firm size. Broadly speaking, this table confirms previous findings that point to a
negative relationship between firm age and mortality, as well as between firm size and
11mortality. This pattern is consistent with the view that "better" finns survive longer and grow
while weaker competitors drop out (Jovanovic 1982). It is difficult, however, to explain the
ratio between insolvencies and voluntary liquidations. For small finns, age and insolvencies
appear tobecorrelatednegatively while there is no easily discernable pattern for larger firms.
For young finns, we can compare our mortality estimates to those of Wagner (1994,
Table I) who presents survival rates for new manufacturing fIrms in Lower Saxony. For ftrms
that are initially two years old the average mortality rate in Wagner's data is about 28 per cent
for cohorts of finns founded in 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982. In our data, we compute a
mortality rate of about 24 per cent in manufacturing for the given age group. The difference is
small enough tobe accounted for bydifferences in industry composition, but it may also be due
tothefact that single proprietorships are underrepresented in oursample.
TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 contains mortality rates (again decomposed into insolvencies and voluntary
liquidations) by legal form and industry. Clearly, limited liability companies (GmbH) and
limited commercial partnerships formed with a limited liability company (GmbH&CoKG)
display the highest insolvency rates. More than 55 per cent of all exits of finns with these legal
forms in our sample are insolvencies. By contrast, for single proprietorships, only about one
tenth of all exits are accounted for by insolvencies. While Table 4 cannot reveal whether some
ofthese differences are driven by age and size effects, the basic patterns are consistent with the
predictions from the model described in section 2. A look at industry differences is instructive,
too. Irrespective of the legal form adopted by the finn, mortality rates are particularly high in
trade and services, with insolvencies accounting for about one quarter of all exits. The latter
statement needs to be qualified somewhat, however, since the current tabulations have not
been weighted yet toreflect the samplingprobabilities.
In Table 5 we present average employment growth rates by firm age and size. Note that
these rates are potentially distorted by the fact that the respective observation periods differ.
The standard deviations are subject to the same qualification. Nonetheless, generally the
growth rates tend to decrease with age and size of the finn. Of course, this result may be
entirely due to selection effects. We will address the selection issue below where we also test
for growthdifferentials between finns incorporated in different legal forms.
5.2 Failure Estimates
Since our observations originate from a cross-sectional stock sample, applying hazard
rate analysis directly would lead to biased results.
10 Instead, we follow Evans (l987a/b) and
analyze the probability offailure in the time period from July I, 1989 to December 31st, 1994
as a function offum size, ftrm age and legal form variables as measured prior to the beginning
10 See Cox and Oates 0984, p. 178) for a discussion of left-truncated samples and the appropriate estimation
techniques.
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of this period.
ll The failure estimates are presented in Table 6. The probability of exit is
modelled as a function of finn size, age and legal fonn on July 1, 1989 (or priorto this date).
We also control for diversification and ownership status. The inclusion of the latter variable
reflects our concern that subsidiaries may be subject to decision-making processes external to
the subsidiary finn.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
In the simple logit estimates with pooled exit types, both finn size and finn age display
a significant and strong negative effect on the finn's likelihood of failure. The marginal effects
ofsize and age are negative for all finns in the sample. Diversified firms are characterized by a
relatively low liquidation risk whileourdummyvariable for subsidiary status is not significantly
different from zero in this specification. Finns in the legal forms of a GmbH&CoKG or OHG
have significantly higher failure rates than single proprietorships, but the GmbH dummy is not
significantly different from zero. F"mally, stock-based companies (AGs) display below-average
failure risks even when finn size and age are included in the regressions. The latter result is
likely to reflect the harsh screening that finns are subjected to in Gennan financial markets
before their sharesare traded publicly.
However, distinguishing between insolvency and voluntary liquidation as the two exit
types clearly improves our understanding of exit dynamics. Itturns outthat the distinction does
not only matter conceptually, but that it is of empirical importance as well. The hypothesis of
identical coefficients for both choices (i.e. correctness of the simple logit specification) can be
rejected quite easily. The respective chi-square test statistic is 279.6 with 40 degrees of
freedom (p<0.001). Testing separately for the identity of the legal fonn dummies or the age
and size variables also yields highly significant test statistics (p<O.OOl). This is not surprising:
the result simply suggests that insolvency and voluntary liquidation are very different exit
mechanisms.12
The patterns revealed by the coefficients are broadly consistent with our hypotheses.
We first consider the effect of the legal fonn and ownership dummy variables before analyzing
the marginal effects of finn age and finn size.
13 Finns in the legal fonn of GmbH or
GmbH&CoKG are much more likely to exit via insolvencies than via voluntary liquidation.
Compared to the reference group of individual proprietorships and holding all other variables
11 We also estimated ordered logit specifications in which the dependent variable was defined in tenns c:i
survival span afterJuly 1, 1989. The results did not differ much from the simple logit estimates.
12 In tenns of the detenninants of exit, our estimates are complementary to those derived by Schary (1991).
She considers retained earnings, dividends, and technological indices as detenninants of exit in the New
England"cotton textile industry,'but without apparent success.
13 Note that usually the sign and extent of the marginal effects cannot be assessed directly from the
coefficients. The marginal effect of a single independent variable Xi on'the probabilitylj of outcomej is
given by dlj I ax;=lj[(3g - Lt(3ikli] the sign of which need not be identical with the sign of the choice-
specific coefficient f)ij' Fork=2 (as in the case described here), the marginal effect ofXi on, say. PI takes
the form dillar; =II (I-ll)(3'1 - fiP:1(3;2 and its sign definitely coincides with the sign of ~'1 if (3/1 and
(3;2 have opposite signs. Note that this is the case for the coefficients of the dwnmy variables GMBH, AG.
KG, andSUBSIDIARY in Table 6.
13constant, the insolvency rate of GmbH finns is 3.11 per cent higher than the insolvency rate of
sole proprietorships (computations of marginal effects at the sample mean), while their
propensity to choose exit via voluntary liquidation is actually somewhat lower than in the case
of fully liable owners. Liability limitations seem to induce a shift towards greater usage of
insolvencies as an exit mechanism. If we consider GmbH&CoKG-type firms, the respective
increase in the probability of insolvency is 2.04 percentage points (p<.Ol), while there is no
significant difference in the likelihood of voluntary liquidation between these firms and fully
liable single proprietorships. These estimates do therefore confinn the expectations derived
from our simple model. Note that this result is inconsistent with Storey's (1994) suggestion
thatthe bank'squest for full collateralization ofrisky credit may undermine liability limitations.
Quite to the contrary, limited liability represents an option that tends to be used extensively as
Table 2 suggested already. The multinomial logit results confinn that the results from the
earlier tabulation are notjust artefacts of industry composition orof other observable variables
like finn size and age.
Other unexpected results with respect to the legal form dummy variables, for example
the high mortality rate of OHG firms, cannot be explained easily on the basis of this model and
require further analysis. One can conjecture that OHGs tend to represent family enterprises in
which ownership succession problems may lead to a relatively high rate of voluntary
liquidations. 14
The results also suggest that the preferred exit mode of subsidiaries is a regular
voluntary liquidation. This result can be explained with two particular regulations in German
bankruptcy and commercial law. First, banks tend to ~ist on a declaration of patronage
(Patronatserkliirung) when they issue loans to subsidiaries of large conglomerates. In such a
declaration, the parent firm commits to securitization of the loan or credit. Second, German
corporate law contains provisions according to which a subsidiary finn cannot file for bank-
ruptcy unless its corporate owners declare bankruptcy at the same time (Durchgriffshajtung).
The latter regulation is supposed to prevent the abuse of subsidiaries for the purpose of
intentfu1loan and creditdefaults.
Since firm age ~d firm size enter the model as a quadratic approximation, we compute
the marginal effects of these two variables for each of the exit alternatives. In the case of
voluntary exit, both variables have a negative marginal effect on failure chances for virtually all
firms in the sample. However, in the case of insolvencies we fmd that only the age effect is
consistently negative and monotically increasing towards zero with increasing age. The
marginal effect offinn size on the probability ofexit via insolvency is initially positive for firms
with up to 18 employees at the beginning of the observation period and negative for larger
firms. To tJ?e best of our knowledge, this result of a non-monotonic relationship between the
risk of insolvency and firm size has not been reported in' the literature. It may indicate that the
exit mechanism of insolvency is not ..profitable" for firms below some minimum size, but the
result warrants furtherexamination.
14 Wethank Rupert Windisch for this suggestion.
145.3 Growth Estimates
In Table 7 we present OLS and two-stage Heckman estimates of our employment
growth equation. Although selection effects matter statistically (the correlation coefficient
between the errors in the selection and the growth equations is significant), the.actual effect of
the selection correction on the coefficients of the growth equation are quite weak. We find
strong evidence against Gibrat's "law" of proportionate effect. Small finns are characterized by
higher employment growth than larger finns. The marginal effect of firm size is negative for
93.8 per cent of all observations in the sample. The effect of firm age is less pronounced: it is
negative for 86.4 per cent of the observations in the sample and only weakly significant for the
majorityofcases.
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
Since the probit selection equation pools both sel~tion processes (see Appendix C),
the coefficient estimates are somewhat difficult to interpret. In the selection equation we use
detailed information (obtained at the beginning the observation period) on the speed with
which firms pay their bills. This is obviously a central variable in credit rating data. In Table
C.1, long delays prior to payment have a negative effect on sample inclusion. This effect is
causedby the non-survivorgroupoffirms which appear to be in financial problems a long time
before the actual liquidation is invoked. Creditreform also issues a recommendation with
respect to granting trade credit. The dummy variable "no credit experience" is apparently a
good predictor for the likelihood that employment information will not be updated. Again, this
may reflect the demand-driven information collection process within the credit rating firm.
Finding a negative correlation between the selection and growth equations is surprising
at first sight, although Dunne and Hughes (1994) report similar results in about half of their
industry-specific regressions. In order to cast some light on this result, we also estimated the
two-stage model excluding the non-survivors. This regression yielded an even larger negative
correlation of about -0.570. Conversely, only including non-survivors but excluding
observations for which no information updating by the credit rating firm had occurred yielded a
slightly positive, but insignificant correlation coefficient. The latter result reflects the typical
non-survivor bias as reported by Evans (1987a!b).
From these results it appears that firms with strong employment growth are not as well
represented in the database as are weaker enterprises. Considering the business rationale of the
credit rating firm, a "preferred treatment" of weakerfirms may make sense if infonhation about
such firms is requested with greater frequency. We reserve a more detailed treatment for future
work, b~t we conjecture that some firms may be able to signal a financially stable condition to
their suppliers so that information on this group of firms is demanded less frequently than
information on financially weak enterprises.
Consistent with the hypotheses developed in section 2, the legal form dummy variables
are strongly correlated with employment growth rates. Firms in the legal forms of GmbH,
GmbH&Co.KG, KG and OHG display growth rates that are approximately 4 per cent higher
than those of single proprietorships. Considering the employment growth rates of KG and
OHG firms, we do not have a simple explanation of the respective level differences in growth
rates. However, these legal forms may be preferred by entrepreneurs with strong financial
15positions. Since we cannot measure such differences, they may be picked up via the legal form
dummy variables. Time and industry dummies prove to -be highly significant in both
specifications although the same qualitative results can be obtained without including them.
Nonetheless, employment growth is a noisy process with most of the variance remaining
unexplained.
While these results confirm our hypotheses with regard to the effect of liability
limitations, they may be subject to distortions if the estimated slope parameters differ across
various legal forms. However, using a simple distinction between limited liability firms (GmbH
and GmbH&CoKG) and all other enterprises, we cannot detect major differences in the
growth:size relationship. In the third column in Table 7, we present growth estimates for firms
in the legal form of GmbHs or GmbH&CoKG with the first legal form as the reference group.
The slope coeffients are remarkably close to those in the first and second column. This is good
news for researchers who cannot distinguish in their data between different legal forms, but this
result may be specific to our data and needs further corroboration. It is also remarkable that
the estimated correlation coefficient virtually drops to zero for firms with limited liability. It
seems natural that a credit rating agency should treat firms with liability limitations differently
from firms in which owners carry the full burden of liability in the case of failure. These
differences in treatment may be reflected in the substantially lower correlation coefficient.
It is well known that a number of econometric problems may occur in the type of
growth equations used here. In particular, the negative correlation between firm size and
growth rates may be a statistical artefact of measurement error as Hall (1987) points out. One
way to circumvent the appearance of the same measurement error on the left-hand and right-
hand side of our growth equation is to rewrite the growth equation and to use /og(E(IJJ)I(12-11)
as the dependent variable and log(£(11))1(12-/1) as an additional independent variable together
with log /og(£(11)). Note that these two variables are not perfectly collinear due to the
differences in observation intervals. Measurement problems with respect to log(£(11)) will now
introduce deviations of the coefficient of log(£(1/))1(12-11) from unity but towards zero. Both in
OLS and two-stage stage Heckman estimates. the respective coefficient is smaller than one,
but on the order of 0.99 or higher, and the other coefficients remain virtually unchanged.
Simple measurement errors are therefore unlikely to cause the notable deviation from Gibrat's
Law.
6 Conclusions and Future Research
~irm survival and employment growth are important measures of firm performance. In
the present paper, we have provided first empirical results for West Germany on the determi-
nants of these performance measures from a newly developed data base. While our results on
the effects of firm size and age on firm survival and growth confirm at the qualitative level
those derived for the corresponding firm populations in other countries, they differ
-quantitatively in major ways yet to be explored in more det,ail. Our estimates suggest in
particularthata separate consideration of the modes of exit is highly desirable.
The data also have allowed us to investigate the effect of liability limitations in the form
of particular legal forms. The economic importance of limited liability enterprises in the West
16Gennan economy is documented by their growing number and share of employment. Most of
our ex ante expectations regarding the survival chances and growth rates of these firms were
confirmed by the regression results. In particular, we found that liability limitations are
correlated with above-average employment growth and higher risk of insolvency. Thus. the
basic hypotheses developed in oursimple model were confinned.
Our empirical work also has emphasized the need to control for a number of potential
biases in the data base we are using. Credit rating data have some appeal. because panel infor-
mation can beobtained at rather low costs. However. using them in empirical work ofthis type
can be extremely costly in tenns of "data cleaning" and risk of misleading results if sample
selectivity is not controlled for appropriately. These considerations should be taken into
account by the numerous research groups in Europe and beyond which are currently trying the
use these data to their full potential.
In spite of these reservations, this data base offers some unique opportunities for
analysis not exploited so far. Its strength is in the deta~led documentation of ownership and
management structures. Any changes in these, as well as in the legal fonn with its implications
on liability and the tax treatment of profits. could be developed as predictors of firm growth as
well as failure.These issues will be the object of future work.
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Appendix A . Proofs
PROPosmON 1: a
L (H) > au(H)
PROOF: The proof is in two steps. We first show that aL(H) > au(H). This implies in
particularthat aL(H) > aU(H) Second, we show that iJaL(H) I iJH > O.
Thefirst statement is shown by implicitelydifferentiating (5):
oaI -1
iJ)., ),=0 = - iJ 2P iJp
-a +2- oa 2 oa
Since the denominator is negative due to the second order condition, this derivative
is negative. Hence an increase of A from zero to a positive level, i.e. a move from
limited tounlimited liability, decreases the chosen project's expected return.
The secondstatement is obtained by again implicitly differentiating (5):
iJ2p ap
oa aHoaa + aH
(PI) iJH 1),=0 = • a 2p ap
-a +2- oa 2 oa
Bythe assumptions on p(H,a) collected under (3), the numerator is positive while
the denominator is again negative by virtue ofthe second ordernecessary condition.
Hence the derivation is positive, yielding a monotonic increase ofaL(H) in H.
PROOF: ByProposition 1 and (3), p(H, aL(H)) < p(H, aU (H)) In particular
p(g aL(fi)) < p(g aU{ff)) .
Thus, it suffices to show that under the condition of Prop. 2,
dpI = apI + iJp ~I < 0
dH A=O aH A=O oa aH A=O - •
Rewriting and using (PI), ourcondition changes to
iJp iJ2pa_ a
2
p apa+ ap ap
aH aa
2 aHaa oa aH aa
iJ2pa + 2 ap
aa
2 aa
The denominator is negative. Conversely, the first expression ofthe numerator is
positivedueto (3). A sufficient condition for the numerator to be nonnegative is
thus ap _ a
2
p a L !:0'or ..!-. ap !:~ ap .
iJH aHaa aL aH aa iJH
20Letb (~,H) bethe solution to (5), and
E(3tu(~,H)):=b(~,H)[h+~)p(H,b(~,H))-~]as well as
E(3t L(H»):=p(H,b (O,H))q>b (O,H).
Lemma: For all H, there exists a unique jl(H) such that E(3t U (jl(H),H)) =E(3t L(H»).
Furthermore, ~ ~ il(H) =)E(3tu(il(H),H))~E(3tL(H)).
Proof: (i) ~ =°implies E(3t U (0, H)) >E(3t L(H»). Conversely, ~ -7 00 implies
E(3t U (~,H))<E(3t L(H») as maximal returns are finite if the projectis successful,
but losses underunlimitedliability increase without bounds if the projectfails.
(ii) Refonnulating and differentiatingthe necessary condition (5) w.r.t. ~,we obtain
( )ra2p ap Jab ( ap L
1+ ~ ldb 2 b +2db a~ + p -1+ ab brO.
Since p ~ 1 and :~ <°byassumption (3), the tenn in the curved bracketis
negative. Furthennore, the tenn in angular brackets is negative by the second-order
d·. H ab be . . fy th uali con Itton. ence a~ must negattveto satiS e eq ty.
The choiceof limited liability is more (less) likely with increased human capital
a~ < a~
endowment, if a~b)0. Inparticular, with a~ <°the range of ~ under which
unlimited liability is chosen decreases with increasing H.
Differentiating E(3t U (11(H), H)) == E(3t L(H)) and refonnulating slightly, we obtain
:~ E(3t U (jl(H), H)):t == ~~ [Ebt L(H» - E(3t U (I1(H),H))].
Since ~E(3tu (~(H),H)) =b(lJ, H)[p(H,b(~, H))-I]< 0, a~ (~)O ifthe
a~ aH
difference inexpectedprofits between limited and unlimited liability increases
(decreases) given b is optimally adjusted. More specifically
a~ < 1+~ < b(O,H)lfJ(H,b(O,H))
aH (»O~---;-(»b(~,H) :~ (H,b(lJ, H))
The left hand term in this inequality exceeds unity by the assumptions that ~ > 1,cp <1.
Both right 'hand terms also exceed unity; the first by Lemma, and the second again by
the Lemma together with the assumption specified under (3) that ~(ap) ~ 0. Thus,
ab aH
the choice;of limited liability is more likely with increased human capital, if either the
optimal project choice involves a much higher return project under limited than under
unlimited liability; or the increase in probability of project success with an increase in
human capital is much stronger ifthe higher return limited liability project is chosen. •
21Appendix B . DataSource and Sample Construction
The data used in this study originate with Verband der Vereine Creditreforrn (WC).
the largest German credit rating agency. Typically. firms enter the Creditrefom data base for
two possible reasons. First. a customer or supplier firm may want to inquire about the financial
situationofthe respective enterprise.
15 Second. credit rating agencies also exploiteconomies of
scope and scale and gather information proactively, in particular by systematically recording
publicly available information on new fIrms. 16 Thus. ,the initial entry into the database is not
necessarily drivenbycontemporaneous demand for information regarding a specific company.
In the initial interview. WC records information. specifIcally on the ownership struc-
ture of the firm. primary and (if appropriate) secondary 5-digit industry classifications, legal
status. management. current employment. current and past annual sales, the date of·
incorporation. and dates of incorporation of legal predecessors of the firm. The time of data
entry is recorded together With these variables. H the information is updated at a later point,
the respective interview date is again recorded with the data. Hence a change in the respective
variables canbeobservedby comparing entries made after the first interview.
Contrary to most panel data explicitly gathered for scientific purposes. the intervals
betweeninterviews are notfixed and can indeed vary substantially. Sincethe credit rating firm's
decision to update information on a particUlar firm is endogenous, we are confronted with a
potentially important source of selection bias. However. Creditreform does not delete entries
from the database even when an enterprise is liquidated at some point or if - for reasons to be
discussed below - a new identification number is assigned to the firm and the original entry is
nolongerupdated.
Since 1989. Creditreform has been supplying data on West German enterprises to a
research group located at the University of Mannheim and the ZEW towards studies on the
dynamics of private sector employment and enterprise failure. These datawere drawn from the
Creditreform data base in intervalsofapproximately six months.17Currently, eight linked cross-
sections are available.
Information updating by credit rating agencies tends to be demand-driven. Thus, even if
company data is entered into the database initially. no updating of the initial information will
occur in a large number of cases. In previous studies (e.g. Evans 1987a/b). such cases have
usually been discarded under the assumption ,that no biases were present. In order to avoid
making use of such a strong assumption, the credit rating data were supplemented with
information obtained from telephone interviews. Between October 1993 and March 1994.
about 2900 telephone interviews were conducted to collect information on companies for
which little or no updating had occurred. Companies were interviewed if (1) the general
company information had n()t been updated by Creditreform within three years prior to
October 1, 1993, (2) data on the number of employees was missing or (3) sales figures were
missing or referring to years priorto 1991. The total number of selected companies was 2835.
H the company appeared to have been liquidated. competitors. suppliers or c~ambers of
commerce were contacted in ordertoverify the liquidation and its date. '
In the telephone surveys. we tried to collect detailed information on the survival status
of the company, in particular whether the company was still operating or not, as well as data
15 Business transactions usually involve trade credit, i.e. credit extending after delivery between billing and
payment. Credit may extend over even longer periods if orders are firm-specific in Williamson's (1975)
sense. In such cases, firms have an interest to assure that their business partners are both willing and able to
redeem the credit; and in particular that they are not in immediate danger of foreclosing. The role of trade
credit for U.S. firms is investigated empirically in Rajan and Petersen (1994).
16 Creditreform uses several information sources in this context. The most important one is a data entry in the
"Handelsregister" which is compulsory for all incorporated firms and for the larger sole proprietorships.
17 This panel database is described in more detail in Stahl (1991).
22on the date at which a change in the survival status of the company had taken place. We
differentiated between the following states. (1) company operating, (2) company liquidated, (3)
relocation, (4) change of legal form with subsequent new entry in the database, (5) merger. (6)
ownership succession by a family member, (7) company sold to a non-family member, (8)
company not found. In Table 8.1 the frequencies ofthese events are summarized.
Some results are of particular interest. First, about 12% out of the interviewed
companies had gone out of business between 1987 and 1990 without Creditreform indicating
the liquidation in the records. This compares to a total liquidation rate of about 10.3 per cent
for the sample used in the survivaVfailure analysis. Second, about 3% of the companies exited
during the observation period by selling or transfering the company to a new owner. Third. we
were not able to track 268 (about 9%) of the companies. Therefore we cannot be sure about
their survival status but we have reasons to assume that most of them ceased to exist prior to
the beginning ofour sampling period.
Table B.I
Survival Status of Companies
(Telephone Survey Results)





Change of Legal Form and 74
New Entry
Merger 5
Ownership Succession by a 27
Family f\'lernber
Compan)' Sold to a Non- 64
I
Family Member
Company not Found 268
L 2835
We also tried to assess the validity of Creditreform iJ1formation for those firms that had
been interviewed recently. We called all 94 companies in our overall sample located in the area
observed by the Saarbriicken Creditreform office. We were able to track" and verify the
company 'information on all 94 firms and did not find any major discrepancies between
Creditreform information and the actual situation of the company. We conclude that company
information that has been updated by the credit rating firm is very reliable. In particular, we
feel reassured that it correctly represents the survival status of the company.
Based on the original data and the complementary information from the telephone
survey, we were able to construct a comprehensive sample of West German films. Our original
VVC sample included observations on 13346 West German firms. i.e. legally independent
enterprises. From this sample we excluded professionals (Freie Ben~re) and non-profit
organizations (246 observations), and all firms in the agricultural, energy or public service
sectors (312 observations). Moreover, a number of firms (290 observations) had ceased to
exist prior to July I, 1989 and were discarded from the sample. These exclusions are based on
23exogeneous criteria and should therefore not bias our results in any way. We consider the
remaining 12498 cases as ourrelevant sample.
Since firms are tracked via a unique identifier, we are bound to lose observations
whenever the credit rating agency changes the identification number of a particular enterprise.
For example, we lose 226 observations for enterprises that relocated and moved to a region
observed by a regional credit rating office different from the one that had originally
administered the data. Furthermore, there are 564 cases of ownership succession (without
merger) which were accompanied by the release of a new identification number. We are fairly
certain that none of these cases involved (at least initially) a closing of the respective business.
We do not considerthese cases as exits or firm failures, since the respective firms may continue
to exist and pursue their previous economic activities. In 158 other cases we were able to
conclude that the firm had been subject to a merger. These cases are excluded here, but will be
subject to future investigations together with the ownership succession cases. Taken together,
relocations, ownership successions and mergers account for 948 cases.
Due to missing values regarding the date of firm formation we lose 317 cases, and 114
observations have to be dropped because other independent variables are suspect or missing.
These cases did not display any particular pattern, and we do not expect any sampling
distortions to emerge in this context. Finally, for 268 firms the credit rating information was
completely outdated and we were unable to track these firms in our telephone survey. It is
likely that the majority of these firms had ceased to exist prior to the beginning of our sampling
period. Thus our final sample for this study consists of 10961 observations. We do not expect
that our selection procedures will result in a major distortion of the results reported in this
paper. However, we plan to investigate some cases in future work, in particular mergers and
ownership successions.
A serious source ofselection bias arises for our growth estimates, since we are not able
to calculate employment growth rates for 2863 out of the remaining ]096] enterprises. First,
1130 firms have ceased to exist during the period under consideration. Neglecting these firms
in the growth estimation is likely to introduce the classical survivor bias. Second. in the case of
1733 firms we were not able to obtain updated employment infonnation either from the
original credit rating database or from the telephone interviews described above. For the
purposes of OUf survival estimates, the situation is somewhat different. For all 10961 firms we
were able to obtain information on the survival status.
24Appendix C . Coefficient Estimates for Heckman Selection
TableC.l
Selection Equation (Probit)
Independellf Variables Coefficient Independent Variables Coefficient
EstillUlte EstillUlte
(t-statistic) (t-statistic)
LSIZE .1958 No Experience With Respect -.1484
(2.990) to Payment Behavior (0.810)
LSIZESQ -.0334 Pays Bills Without Delay Reference
(9.184) Group
LAGE .1686 Payment within 30 days -.2482
(1.579) (4.891)
LAGESQ -.0112 Payment takes longer -.2055
(3.319) (2.355)
LSIZE*LAGE .02552 Pays slowly -.5124
(3.319) (3.466)
SUBSIDIARY -.1543 Payment after reminder -.6483
(2.502) (2.720)
DIVERSIFICATION .0694 Payments Overdue -1.742
(1.810) (3.601)
GM13H .2359 No Credit Experience -1.057
(6.168) (5.587)
GM13HCO .07351 Crediting Ad"ised Reference
(1.215) Group
OHG -.0264 CrediTing Possible .01491
W.24]) 10.1691
KG -.0036 Crediting Within Limits .0272
(0.0461 (0.258)
13GB -.0471 Crediting With Securities -.2091
11)52]) (1.173)




Test Statistics X~ (((fJ
Size and Age 478.57 (5) Payment Dummies 37.80 (6)
Legal Form Dummies 47.22 (61 Crediting Dummies 42.97 (6)
Industry Dummies 128.57 (27)
Number ofobcrservations 10961 log Likelihood -3034.29
Note: Single proprietorships arc the reference group for legal form dummies.
25Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
All Firms Finns with Employment Growth
(1096] Observations) Observations
(8098 Observations)
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev.
Employment Growth 0.039 0.195
SIZE 275.58 2252.21 342.]6 2347.31
AGE 29.]5 35.26 31.57 35.90
LSIZE 2.5] 2.07 2.86 2.12
LSIZESQ 10.62 ]5.93 12.71 ]7.05
LAGE 2.79 l.l4 8.79 1.12
LAGESQ 9.12 6.28 78.66 19.44




















Choice ofLegal Form by Entrepreneur's Terminal Degree
in Single-Owner Enterprises
Column Percentage (Number of Observations)
Entrepreneur's Terminal Degree
LegalFonn No Apprentice- Apprenticeship Master University Doctorate or Total
shio TrainiOSl: Training Craftsman Training Professorship
Single 82.98% 69.12% 82.75% 38.23% 16.86% 69.60%
Proprietorship (117) (620) (]406) (237) (14) (2394)
BGB 3.55% 3.90% 2.65% 3.87% 6.02% 3.31%
(5) (35) (45) (24) (5) (1]4)
GmbH&Co.KG 8.51% 9.59% 4.41% 28.71% 44.58% 11.28%
(]2) (86) (75) (]78) (37) (88)
GmbH 4.96% 17.39% 10.18% 29.19% 32.53% 15.81%
(7) (]56) (73) O8I) (27) (544)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(]4l) (897) (l699) (620) (83) (3440)
Note: Unwclghted Samplc Estimates x: =626.06 (df =12)
26Table 3
Total Mortality, Insolvency and Voluntary Liquidation Rates
by Firm Age and Finn Size
(July 1, 1989 - March 1, 1994)
% Total Mortality
(% Insolvencies, % Voluntary Liquidations)
Numberof Observations
Firm Age onJuly 1. 1989
(Years)
Firm Size
onJuly 1, 1989 <2 2-5 5-10 10-25 25-50 >50 Total
(Emplovees)
23.7 19.0 14.9 9.9 10.5 9.6 12.9
1-19 (7.3, 16.4) (5.0.14.0) (4.1.10.8) (2.4. 7.5) <0.9.9.6) (0.7.8.9) (2.9, 10.0)
274 1119 1557 2458 1269 868 7545
6.3 19.4 11.3 6.6 5.6 4.7 7.5
20-49 (6.3,0.0) 06.1,3.3) (6.5,4.8) <3.8.2.8) (2.3,3.3) (2.2,2.5) (4.3,3.2)
16 62 168 318 213 236 1013
0.0 8.3 4.0 4.2 8.8 6.1 5.9
50-99 1O.0.0.0l (5.6,2.7) 0.3.2.7) <3.0, 1.2) (4.8,4.0) (2.0,4.1) <3.0.2.8)
12 36 75 168 125 148 564
5.0 4.5 7.2 3.0 3.8 1.6 3.2
10~-500 (5.0.0.m W.O. 4.5) (2.4,4.8) (1.7, 1.3) (1.7,2.ll (1.0,0.6) (l.5.1.7)
20 44 83 235 234 308 924
0.0 3.1 9.3 3.0 1.7 1.5 2.2
> 500 1O.0.0.0l W.O. 3.)) (2.3,7.0) <0.6,2.4) <0.0, 1.7) <0.4, 1.0) 10.4, 1.8)
15 32 43 169 178 478 915
Total 19.9 17.9 13.7 8.5 8.3 5.6 10.3
{ (6.5.13.41 (5.3.12.6) (4.1,9.6) (2.4,6.ll (1.3. 7.0) 10.9,4.7) (2.7.7.oi
337 1293 1926 3348 2019 2038 10961
Note: Unwclghtcd Sample Estimates
27Table 4
Total Mortality, Insolvency and Voluntary Liquidation Rates
by Legal Fonn and Industry
(July 1, 1989 - March 1,1994)
% Total Mortality
(% Insolvencies, % Voluntary Liquidations)
Number of Observations
Industry
LegalForm Manu- Construction Trade Trans- Finance Services Total
facturing portation
Single 10.8 7.6 1·.1.7 15.6 11).6 12.3 11.8
Proprietorship (lA,9A) (104.6.2) (1.0,13.7) (2.6, 13.0) (0.0.19.6) !D.9. 11.4) (1.3. 10.5)
1082 1053 1348 275 56 757 ·671
BGB 7.0 5.9 23.4 0.0 40.0 10.3 11.7
(0.0, 7.0) (2.0,3.9) (2.1,21.3) (0.0,0.0) 10.0,40.0) (0.0, 10.3) (0.9. 10.7)
43 51 47 7 5 48 231
OHG 3.8 11.1 24.5 20.0 0.0 1-1.0 13.-1
(0.0,3.8) (5.6,5.5) (0.0,24.5) (6.7, 13.3) 10.0.0.0) W.O. 1-1.61 (1.1. 12.31
52 18 49 IS II 41 186
KG 6.8 4.0 10.5 2.9 0.0 0.8 7.0
(1.2,5.6) (4.0,0.0) (0.9,9.6) (2.9,0.0> (0.0.0.0) (2.7. -1.1) (1.6. 5.4)
162 25 114 35 19 73 428
GMBHCO 7.3 7.8 11.3 8.3 0.0 ~.8 8.3
(3.6,3.7) (3.6,4.2) n.1. 8.2) (1.9.6.5) (0.0.0.0) (2.6.6.2) D.1. 5.2)
422 166 159 108 13 228 1096
GMBH 9.1 10.1 13.4 7.4 6.9 10.5 10.3
(4.9,4.2) (5.9,4.2) (5.2,8.2) (2.9. -1.5) (2.9. -1.0> (-1.3.6.2) (4.8.5.5)
1213 622 783 242 102 1020 3982
AG 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.0 0.9
(0.0,0.6) (0.0.0.0) (0.0.0.0> 10.0,0.0) (0.6,0.5) (2.0.0.0) (0.4. n.5)
176 9 26 29 178 49 -167
Total 8.7 8.3 l·n 10.4 5.7 10.7 10.3
(2.9,5.8) (3.1,5.2) (204. 11.7) (2.5.7.9) (1.0.4.7) (2.7.8.0> (2.7,7.6)
3150 1944 2526 711 384 2246 10961
Note: Unwelghted Sample Esttmates
28Table 5
Logarithmic Employment Growth Rates
by Firm Age and Firm Size
Mean Logarithmic Growth Rate (Standard Deviation)
Number of Observations
Firm Age on July I, 1989
(Years)
Film Size
on July 1, 1989 <2 2-5 5-10 10-25 25-50 >50 Total
(Employees)
1-19 13.9 (25.6) 9.5 (23.1) 7.95 (21.0) 5.909.1) 3.7 (20.7) 1.1 06.5) 6.1 (20.5)
167 699 1002 1664 867 626 5025
20-49 6.2 (24.9) 1.9 (26.9) 5.3 (20.5) 2.5 07.8) -1.709.3) -0.5 04.6) 1.3 08.7)
15 46 139 271 183 214 868
50-99 8.3 (lOA) -0.6 (25.9) -0.2 (22.2) 4.7 08.7) -1.1 (19.2) 1.208.9) 1.609.8)
11 30 70 152 110 127 500
100-500 3.9 (20.9) 0.9 (11.5) -2.3 (22.7) -0.5 (20.8) 0.907.7) 0.4 05.8) 0.208.2)
17 41 73 207 215 298 851
> 500 -12.5 (25.7) -2.1 (15.5) -2.2 (10.8) 0.5 (l0.1) -0.8 (12.8) -0.6 01.8) -0.8 (12.2)
13 30 37 151 169 454 854
Total 10.8 (25.4) 7.9 (23.0) 6.4(21.]) 4.6 (18.8) 1.8 09.4) 0.3 (15.3) 3.909.5)
223 846 1321 2445 1544 1719 8098





Point Estimates Marginal Point EstimLltes M(lIg E./.fects on
E/lects all Probabili(l'0/
Independent Probabilitl·. Insoll'en~y Voluntw}' Ins(Jll'ell~y Voluntm)'
Variables ofFailllf~ Liquidation Liquidation
LSIZE -.296 SIZE .371 -.49-1 SIZE
(4.114) (2.653) (6.084)
LSIZESQ .005 neg. for all -.126 .022 pos. for ncg. for all
(0.409) firms (4.745) (1.898) firms <18 fillTl:;
LAGE -.247 -.688 -.130 l'fllployccs.




AGE (0.335) (2.285) (0.-109)
LSIZE*LAGE -.002 neg. for all .161 -.00-1 ncgatiyc for ncg. for nCi,·


































+0.20% -2.70o/r (2,45}) (0.727) (2.651)
CONSTANT -.900 -3.606 -.945
(2.829) (4.740) (2.737)
Test Statistics
Size and Age 222.46 (5) 289.61 (101
x 2 (df)
Legal Form Dummies 18.35 (6) 77.62 (12)
X Z (df)
Industry Dummies 75.55 (27) 120.69 (54)
X
2 (df)
log Likelihood -3576.79 -3873.44
Number of 10961 10961
oberservations
Note: 27 industry dummy variables were included in all regressions. Single proprietorships
are the reference group for legal form dummies. Marginal effects for the dummy
variables were computed at sample means within the respective group of firms.
30Table 7
Employment Growth Estimates
Independent Variables OLS Heckman Heckman
(All Finlls) (All Finlls) (Limited Liability
Finlls)
-.0971 -.1053 -.0989








































Correlation betll'ecn Selcction -.304 -.087
and Growth Equation (3:566) 0.201)
S.E.E. .1866 .1865 .1876
Test Statistics F(df} X
2 (df) X
2 (df)
Size and Age 82:87 (5, 8039) 601.57 (5) 231.05 (5)
Legal Fonn Dummies 13.50 (6, 8039) 80.69 (6)
Industry Dummies 3.26 (27, 8039) 104.00 (27) 60.09 (27)
Time Dummies 9.5808,8039) 140.17 (18) 83.68 (18)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0849 0.0861 0.0832
Numberofoberservations 8098 ~ 10961 5078
Note: 27 industry dummy variables were included in all regressions.
Single proprietorships are the reference group for legal fonn
dummies. For the coefficients of the selection equation for the full
sample see Appendix B.
31